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I. INTRODUCTION
Who gets the money when there isn't enough to go around?
This is the practical question that the bankruptcy system seeks to
answer every day.' In answering this question, the Bankruptcy Code
draws a particularly bright line at the filing of a bankruptcy petition.2
The filing of a petition creates the bankruptcy estate, which is a dis-
1. Reducing the bankruptcy system to this generalization may seem trite. Professor
Jackson has argued forcefully, however, that the core functions of bankruptcy law are to limit
what creditors can take from the debtor (addressed by the automatic stay provision) and to
"decide rights among creditors when there are not enough assets to go around." THOMAS H.
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 4 (1986); see also Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777, 789-90 (1987) (noting bankruptcy's role in allocat-
ing losses when such losses are inevitable).
In the context of postpetition punitive fines, this central idea-that bankruptcy principally
serves to define who gets paid when there are insufficient assets-must be kept in the forefront
for two reasons. First, the idea highlights the general dichotomy between whether a right exists
against the debtor and the priority such a right receives. Whether a right exists is generally
within the province of non-bankruptcy law. See JACKSON, supra, at 33. But the existence of a
right against the debtor says nothing about who gets paid out of the insufficient assets; this is
purely a question of each claim's priority, which is defined by bankruptcy law as a debt-collec-
tion matter. See Kathryn R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 69, 118 (1993) [hereinafter Heidt, Automatic Stay]; David M. Hyman, Troubled
Waters: When Environmental Enforcement Meets Bankruptcy, 18 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 26, 36
(April 1992).
Second, in cases ending with a Chapter 7 liquidation, the question of who gets paid helps to
frame the interests at stake. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, non-bankruptcy disputes between the
government and the debtor are transformed into a dispute between creditors. The debtor will
either cease to exist or will emerge as an empty corporate shell; thus the only question is which
creditors will be paid. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Undermining Bankruptcy Law and Policy:
Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 56 U. PITT. L.
REV. 627, 628-29 (1995) [hereinafter Heidt, Undermining Bankruptcy] (arguing that the Torwico
court misunderstood bankruptcy as a battle between debtor and creditor as opposed to a dispute
between creditors); Heidt, Automatic Stay, supra, at 118 ("The contest is not between the debtor
and government [creditor], it is between one group of creditors and another."); Scott P. Hilsen,
Enforcing Criminal Money Judgments in Bankruptcy: Is the Government Out of Line?, 8 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 259, 284 (1992) (arguing that in bankruptcy, government interests are weighed
against those of other creditors).
2. Bankruptcy proceedings are initiated by the filing of a petition by the debtor, a joint
petition by the debtor and spouse, or an involuntary petition filed by creditors of the debtor. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (1994). In voluntary bankruptcy cases, the petition under section 301 or
302 constitutes the order for relief, and all events relating to the debtor or bankruptcy
proceeding are classified as either prepetition or postpetition. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-302. In
involuntary cases fied under section 303, the order for relief does not coincide with the petition,
but instead arises after the bankruptcy court determines either that the debtor has not timely
controverted the petition, or that if the petition is challenged, certain statutory criteria have
been satisfied such that the involuntary bankruptcy case should proceed. See 11 U.S.C. §
303(h). In an involuntary case, the definition of prepetition remains the same, but postpetition
events are further subdivided into two categories: claims arising in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business during the time between the involuntary filing and the order for relief are
treated as if they arose prepetition, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(f) (1994), while all other events arising
after the filing of the petition are classified as postpetition.
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tinct legal entity from the debtor.3 Creditors with claims against the
debtor arising before filing ("prepetition) 4 receive payment of their
claim, if at all, through bankruptcy's collective distribution scheme.
In contrast, persons whose claims arose after filing ("postpetition"),
but before completion of the bankruptcy proceeding, cannot receive
payment of their claims through the general bankruptcy distribution5
because their claims are against the estate, rather than against the
debtor.6
The ability of a postpetition creditor to recover from the estate
depends on whether the postpetition claim qualifies as an administra-
tive expense under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). Postpetition claims granted
priority will be paid in their entirety-even if this exhausts the
estate-prior to payment of any prepetition claims7 Postpetition
claims denied administrative expense priority are either discharged8
in a Chapter 11 reorganization or individual Chapter 7 liquidation,10
or they survive against the worthless shell of the debtor remaining
after a corporate Chapter 7 liquidation. Thus payment of postpetition
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
4. This Note is concerned exclusively with the priority relationship between prepetition
claims and postpetition punitive claims. Because of this focus, all analysis in this Note assumes
that the issue of when a claim arose has been correctly determined as either pre- or postpeti-
tion.
Determining when a claim "arose," however, is by no means an easy issue, particularly with
claims for latent tort injuries (e.g., asbestos or DES exposure), where the negligence may occur
prepetition but the harm may manifest itself after the bankruptcy has been filed or even
resolved. See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay), 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991)
(considering timing issues in the definition of a claim); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF
BANKRUPTCY 90 (rev. ed. 1993); KATHRYN R. HEiDT, ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY 3.04, at 3-37 (1993); Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in
Bankruptcy: A Fundamental Framework, 44 FLA. L. REv. 153, 175-86 (1992) [hereinafter Heidt,
Fundamental Framework]; Richard P. Krasnow & Debra Dardeneau, The Treatment of
Environmental Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ALI-ABA COURSES OF STUDY: CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 127, 140-
43 (1997); Jeffrey S. Theuer, Aligning Environmental Policy and Bankruptcy Protection: Who
Pays for Environmental Claims under the Bankruptcy Code?, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 465, 509-
16 (1996).
5. As with almost any bankruptcy generalization, an exception exists. See 11 U.S.C. §
348(d) (1994) (treating certain postpetition obligations as prepetition if the case is converted
from one Chapter to another).
6. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 34.
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(aXl), 726(a)(1), 1129(aX9)(A) (1994).
8. "Discharge" in bankruptcy is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 524. In practical terms, once a
debt has been discharged, the creditor can only recover sums beyond those awarded in the
bankruptcy proceeding if the debtor makes additional payments voluntarily.
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(dXl)(A) (1994).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(aX1) (1994) (discharge not available if the debtor is not an
individual).
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claims is generally an all-or-nothing proposition contingent upon the
claim being granted administrative expense priority.",
Congress defined administrative expenses to include those
expenses necessary to the bankruptcy proceeding, such as com-
pensation for trustees, creditor costs in filing an involuntary bank-
ruptcy petition, and reasonable attorney and accountant fees.12
Congress also defined administrative expenses to include the "actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate,""s thus leaving
courts with the task of interpreting and defining the outer boundaries
of administrative expense priority. While it is clear that postpetition
costs that actually benefit the estate-including costs concerned with
the continuing operation of the business-fall within this category
and should receive administrative expense priority, it is less clear
whether postpetition costs that do not benefit the estate should
qualify as "actual and necessary" administrative expenses. 14
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the 1968 case of
Reading Co. v. Brown."s Reading concerned a compensatory damages
claim for the negligence of the receiver in a Chapter XI arrangement.'6
The Court granted administrative expense priority for this claim and
held that it was more "natural and just" that "those injured by the
operation of the business during an arrangement should.., recover
ahead of those for whose benefit the business is carried on."1'
Reading thus established compensatory fairness as a central interpre-
tive principle in determining what costs would receive administrative
expense priority.
Postpetition punitive fines, which by definition are non-com-
pensatory, add a new wrinkle to the question. Some courts consider-
ing these punitive fines have granted administrative expense priority
based solely upon Reading and its discussion of costs ordinarily
11. C.f. James K McBain, Environmental Impediments to Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 68
IND. L.J. 233, 243 (1992) (recognizing in the context of claims for environmental cleanup that
determination of administrative expense priority is an "all or nothing decision").
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994).
13. Id.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
16. An arrangement with creditors is "[a] plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction,
or extension of the time of payment of his debts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (6th ed. 1990).
Chapter XI proceedings under the superseded Bankruptcy Act were called arrangements, and
Chapter 11 reorganizations under the current Bankruptcy Code are likewise a form of arrange-
ment. This Note adopts the terminology of "arrangements" for Bankruptcy Act Chapter XI
proceedings but "reorganizations" for Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 proceedings.
17. Reading, 391 U.S. at 477,482.
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incident to the operation of a business. 8 Such decisions, however,
clearly violate the Reading Court's concern for compensatory fairness,
because they leave injured claimants uncompensated in order to fully
compensate uninjured claimants. 19
Other courts considering postpetition punitive fines have ac-
knowledged that Reading alone cannot provide the basis for adminis-
trative expense priority.20 These courts instead have granted priority
based upon 28 U.S.C. § 959, which requires that bankruptcy estates
be operated in accordance with all valid state laws.21 These courts
have reasoned that denying administrative expense priority for post-
petition punitive fines provides an advantage to bankrupt businesses
over their nonbankrupt competitors, thus violating the principle of
"competitive neutrality."22 Granting administrative expense priority
for postpetition punitive fines based upon section 959's competitive
18. See, e.g., Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 116 F.3d 16, 20
(1st Cir. 1997); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827, 830 (D. Kan. 1991).
19. In the context of prepetition punitive fines, Congress has expressed a clear fairness
judgment that when there is not enough money to go around, parties should be fully compen-
sated for actual losses before punitive fines are paid. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(aX4) (1994). This
section distinguishes (and reduces the priority of) certain claims based solely upon the fact that
they are punitive and "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such
claim." Id. Thus, for example, a timely-filed claim based upon a judgment for $100,000 compen-
satory damages and $500,000 punitive damages would fall into two different priorities:
$100,000 would be second priority, and $500,000 would be fourth priority (and would thus be
paid only after all higher-priority claims had been paid in full).
While this prepetition policy does not apply to postpetition punitive fines, see Alabama
Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining), 963 F.2d 1449, 1460 (11th Cir.
1992), it demonstrates congressional understanding that compensatory fairness cannot be used
as the basis for preferring punitive fines over compensatory claims. For an extensive review of
the treatment of prepetition fines under the Bankruptcy Act, and the scope of obligations
classified as fines, see J.F. Ghent, Annotation, Bankruptcy: Disallowance of Claims for
'Penalties" under 11 U.S.C. § 93(i), 1 A.L.R. FED. 657 (1969).
20. See, e.g., N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1456 (holding the Reading compensatory fairness
concern inapplicable to punitive fines).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) provides:
[e]xcept as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager appointed
in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession,
shall manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or
manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such
property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof.
22. See N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458; Kentucky v. Karst Robbins Coal Co., No. 94-335,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6296 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 1995); In re Double B Distribs., Inc., 176 B.R.
271 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Motel Investments, Inc., 172 B.R. 105 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1994). "Competitive neutrality" is the idea that bankruptcy should not become a haven from
which debtors can gain advantage over non-bankrupt competitors by not complying with
onerous regulatory requirements. See In re White Crane Trading Co., 170 B.R. 694, 702 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1994); David A. Brenningmeyer, The Limited Power of Federal Bankruptcy Courts to
Stay Enforcement of State Environmental Regulations, 44 ME. L. REV. 485, 509 (1992); Heidt,
Automatic Stay, supra note 1, at 126. See also infra Part ILC.
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neutrality rationale, however, interferes with the compensatory fair-
ness principle that was so important to the Reading Court.
In reality, compensatory fairness and competitive neutrality
simply conflict with one another. Uniformly granting administrative
expense priority for postpetition punitive fines violates compensatory
fairness; uniform denial of priority violates competitive neutrality.
This Note develops an administratively feasible interpretation of
priority expenses that falls within the courts' broad interpretive
power and recognizes the importance of both compensatory fairness
and competitive neutrality.
Part II of this Note looks at judicial interpretation and devel-
opment of actual and necessary costs entitled to administrative ex-
pense priority. Part III then examines in detail the two rationales
courts have used to grant administrative expense priority for post-
petition punitive fines. Finally, Part IV proposes an alternative, sug-
gesting that granting administrative expense priority for these fines
in successful Chapter 11 reorganizations, but denying priority in
Chapter 7 liquidations, properly interprets the scope of the Reading
fairness principle and best effectuates the objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code. This interpretation of actual and necessary costs is
within the courts' power and is administratively feasible under cur-
rent bankruptcy rules. Based upon these advantages, this Note con-
cludes that courts should interpret Reading as a narrow fairness-
driven category of actual and necessary costs, and should only grant
priority for postpetition punitive fines in successful Chapter 11
reorganizations where the debtor would receive an unfair competitive
advantage if the fines were denied priority.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE PRIORITY IN BANKRUpTY
Administrative expenses are postpetition obligations that are
accorded priority for policy reasons.2 To encourage estates and
23. To receive priority, administrative expenses must be incurred postpetition. See DAVID
G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 7-11, at 464 (1993) (discussing denial of administrative
expense priority to claim from a creditor who delivered goods to the debtor just hours before the
debtor filed for bankruptcy). Section 64(aXl) of the now-repealed Bankruptcy Act expressed this
requirement directly, and it is logically required by the reference to the "estate" in section
503(1)(A) of the present Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 503(1)(A). The sole exception is 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(3XA), granting priorty for the costs of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.
Most denials of administrative expense priority have turned on this issue, and this statutory
requirement has been construed quite strictly so as to limit administrative expenses. See Otte
v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974); WILLiAM L. NORTON, JR., 2 BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 42:13 (2d ed. 1997); Theuer, supra note 4, at 506. Strict interpretation of the
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creditors to undertake certain costs, Congress sought to ensure
repayment by granting these costs administrative expense priority.24
Congress enumerated a number of administrative expenses that
result from the bankruptcy proceeding itself.25 In addition, however,
Congress recognized that the estate will incur many costs that do not
fall within these enumerated categories, and such expenses may also
receive administrative expense priority as "actual, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate."26
Actual and necessary expenses include expenses which are not
necessitated by the bankruptcy proceeding itself, but which arise from
the continued operation of the estate during the proceeding. The
estate will usually continue to operate during a Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation27 and it will sometimes continue to operate during a Chapter 7
liquidation.28 The estate will incur costs arising from these continued
postpetition requirement maximizes the amount of the estate ultimately available to prepetition
creditors.
Priority for administrative expenses has a long pedigree, first appearing in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1800. See David M. Reeder, The Administrative Expense Priority in Bankruptcy-A
Survey, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 135, 136 (1986/87).
24. Administrative expense priority is generally effective protection for a person undertak-
ing these costs. But in extreme cases, administrative expenses can total more than the value of
the estate, in which case all allowed administrative expense priority claims will share pro-rata
in the estate distribution. See WILLIAM M. COLLIER, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 503.03[5][b]
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1997). A classic example comes from Reading Co. v. Brown,
391 U.S. 471 (1968). In Reading, the principle asset had been destroyed by fire, and the
$3,500,000 in negligence claims was "substantially more than the total assets of the [estate]."
Id. at 473. Thus the successful petitioners in Reading were assured of at most a partial pro-rata
recovery on their claims.
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994).
26. Id.
27. Chapter 11 contemplates the rehabilitation of the debtor's business rather than its
liquidation. To this end, the Chapter 11 estate will usually continue to operate, in most circum-
stances under the same management as before the proceeding began. See generally Harvey R.
Miller & Erica M. Ryland, The Role of Mega Cases in the Development of Bankruptcy Law, in
Tim DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE SECOND
CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 189, 209 (1995); IRVING SULMEYER ET AL., COLLIER HANDBOOK
FOR TRUSTEES AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION § 20.02-03 (Lawrence P. King ed., 1997). But
occasionally-particularly where the debtor has been forced into an involuntary Chapter
11-the estate may cease operations. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Karst Robbins Coal Co., No. 94-335,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6296, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 1995) (relating to an involuntary Chapter
11 debtor in possession that ceased operations while seeking to convert to a Chapter 7).
28. An economic assumption underlying Chapter 7 is that orderly liquidation is likely to
produce more value than piecemeal liquidation. See Elizabeth Warren, Evaluate the Present
and Shape the Future, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE
COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 255, 268 (1995). While it is presumed
that a business worth operating would file under Chapter 11, there are certain circumstances
under which continuing operations benefit orderly liquidation and ultimately increase the
return to the creditors. See SULMEYERET AL., supra note 27, § 10.10[1]. In such situations, the
bankruptcy court may authorize continued operations by the Chapter 7 estate. See 11 U.S.C. §
721.
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operations (the most obvious example is a reorganizing debtor con-
tinuing to buy inventory for sale). Under these circumstances, society
benefits from third parties' continued business dealings with the
estate. These dealings help to rehabilitate the debtor's estate in a
Chapter 11 reorganization and to preserve the assets of the estate in a
Chapter 7 liquidation.29 To encourage third parties to do business
with the estate, courts have interpreted "actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate" to include obligations incurred in
the continuing operation of the debtor's business in bankruptcy.30
Thus administrative expenses are not static, congressionally
defined categories of costs. Instead, Congress chose to define a num-
ber of specific costs as administrative expenses, but also to include a
broad inclusive category of actual and necessary costs which could be
flexibly interpreted and developed by the courts. Postpetition
punitive fines (other than tax fines31) are not expressly included as
administrative expenses. Therefore, if they are to be granted priority,
it must be through judicial recognition as actual and necessary costs.
This section summarizes three different judicial interpreta-
tions of actual and necessary administrative expenses: the traditional
"benefit to the estate" requirement; the Supreme Court's
compensatory fairness exception to the benefit requirement from
Reading Co. v. Brown; and the section 959 competitive neutrality
exception to the benefit requirement.
A. Actual and Necessary Expenses Under the Bankruptcy Act:
The Benefit Requirement
Under the Bankruptcy Act, a postpetition obligation had to
have benefited the estate to receive administrative expense priority as
an "actual and necessary [cost] of preserving the estate."2 This bene-
29. See Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir.
1976).
30. See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 475 (1968); COLLIER, supra note 24, §
503.061].
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1XC).
32. See, e.g., In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d at 954 ("[E]ven when there has
technically been performance by the contract creditor during the reorganization period, he will
not be entitled to section 64(aX1) priority if the bankrupt estate was not benefited in fact
therefrom."); American Anthrocite and Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119,
124 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Where no benefits are received by the bankrupt estate or its representative
under the contract, and the contract is not assumed, the creditor's claim is not entitled to
priority."); Chase Bag Co. v. Schouman, 129 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1942) ("The real question to
be determined is whether the credit was one which preserved or benefited the estate."); First
NaVl Bank v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 50, 54 (10th Cir. 1939) ("the bank was entitled to priority only
to the extent that the funds which it advanced benefited the estate"); In re Cohen, 64 F.2d 103,
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RE-READING READING
fit requirement kept fees and administrative expenses at a minimum
so as to preserve as much of the estate as possible for the creditors.33
American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Arrivabene34
demonstrates how courts interpreted "benefit to the estate" narrowly
in bankruptcy to preserve the estate as much as possible for the
prepetition creditors. In Arrivabene, the debtor chartered two
freighters, and the creditors provided the freighters for the debtor's
exclusive use pursuant to the contracts. The debtor failed to obtain
cargo for either freighter, and later filed for an arrangement.3 5 The
arrangement trustee had the power to affirm or reject these
prepetition contracts; but until the trustee reached his decision, the
freighters were contractually required to remain at the loading ports
and could not be reassigned or used for any other purpose.3 6 The
trustee ultimately rejected the contracts, and the creditors sought
administrative expense priority for losses during the two months that
the freighters were required to remain on call for the trustee.3 7
The district court and court of appeals both rejected
administrative expense priority.3 8 Because the trustee never used the
freighters and received no other tangible benefits from the executory
contracts, the creditors' losses did not benefit the estate and thus
were not entitled to administrative expense priority.39 The only
"benefit" received by the estate was the option to retain the services of
the boats, and this benefit was not sufficient to support
administrative expense priority for the creditors' losses.40
The reasoning in Arrivabene suggests that, in the interest of
limiting administrative expenses and preserving the estate, courts
should construe benefit to the estate narrowly inside bankruptcy. If
analogous facts occurred outside of bankruptcy-parties entered into
104 (2d Cir. 1933) ("we hold that beneficial services performed after petition filed may be
compensated").
33. See Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974); NORTON, supra note 23, § 42:13;
Theuer, supra note 4, at 506.
34. 280 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960).
35. For the definition of "arrangement," see supra note 16.
36. See Arrivabene, 280 F.2d at 119.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 125-26.
40. See id. at 126. The court reached this result using a very narrow definition of benefit
to the estate: "Here the only benefit conferred upon the debtor in possession... was the value
of the option either to accept or reject the charter." Id; cf Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsenthall,
116 F. 961 (6th Cir. 1902) (granting administrative expense priority for payments on an unoc-
cupied leasehold because exclusion of competitors from the leasehold actually benefitted the
estate).
1998] 1467
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a technically defective charter contract, the freighter was provided to
the shipper, it sat empty and unused for two months, and then the
shipper refused to perform based upon the contract defect-courts
could formulate some remedy to protect the shipowner, and would
likely find that the shipper received considerable enrichment by
having the freighter available.41  In the context of bankruptcy,
however, the Arrivabene court required a more tangible benefit to the
estate, thus limiting the scope of administrative expenses.
Courts applied the strict benefit requirement frequently under
the superseded Bankruptcy Act to insure that administrative ex-
penses were minimized.42 Under the Bankruptcy Code, this close
judicial scrutiny of actual benefit to the estate has been weakened by
the Reading compensatory fairness exception to the benefit require-
ment, discussed 'immediately below. Nonetheless, a few present-day
courts continue to adhere to the Arrivabene "heightened standard" or
"tangible benefit requirement" by requiring that the estate receive
"substantial" and "direct" benefits.43
B. Reading Co. v. Brown and the Compensatory Fairness
Exception to the Benefit Requirement
The 1968 Supreme Court decision in Reading Co. v. Brown4
effected a revolutionary change in the scope of actual and necessary
administrative expenses. Reading addressed the issue of whether
damages for injury to third parties resulting from the negligence of a
receiver administering an estate under a Chapter XI arrangement
constituted actual and necessary costs entitled to administrative
expense priority under section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.45  The
41. Outside of bankruptcy, courts could have and likely would have found the debtor liable
to the creditors for supplying the ships, either for the contract amount under a promissory
estoppel theory, or for the amount of the creditors' losses under a quantum meruit theory.
42. See, e.g., Chase Bag Co. v. Schouman, 129 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1942); First Nat'l Bank v.
Robinson, 107 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1939). These cases illustrate that under the Bankruptcy Act,
benefit to the state was a fact-intensive inquiry.
43. See Gull Indus., Inc. v. John Mitchell, Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386, 388 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1994) (noting that "[aidministrative status is allowed when a claim... directly and sub-
stantially benefits the estate," but deciding the case on other grounds); COLLIER, supra note 24,
§ 503.06[3][b] n.15 (citing In re White Motor Corp., 831 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1987)).
44. 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
45. See id. at 476. In Reading, a realty corporation filed a petition for a Chapter XI ar-
rangement, and a receiver was appointed to conduct the debtor's business. During the ar-
rangement, a fire originating in the debtor's building destroyed the building and damaged
adjacent real and personal property. Fire loss claimants filed 147 claims, each styled as a claim
for "administrative expenses" under the arrangement, and each asserting that the receiver's
negligence in operating the debtor's estate caused the fire. See id. at 473. A short time later the
debtor was voluntarily adjudicated bankrupt, and a Chapter VII liquidation proceeding was
1468 [Vol. 51:1459
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Court's decision to grant administrative expense priority to such tort
claims provided a fundamental reinterpretation of actual and neces-
sary costs.
Although the tort claims at issue did not benefit the estate in
the conventional sense,46 the Supreme Court granted administrative
expense priority.47 The Court identified compensatory fairness to all
claimants as the decisive factor in granting administrative expense
priority for non-beneficial tort damages, 48 adopting the position that
struck the majority as "just."49
The Court in Reading concluded that it seemed "more natural
and just" for "those injured by the operation of the business during an
arrangement [to] recover ahead of those for whose benefit the
business is carried on."50 This holding-and the facts on which it is
based-clearly implicates a concern with compensating injured par-
ties, and a careful reading suggests that compensation for injuries lies
at the heart of the Court's fairness concerns in Reading.
The Court identified two specific fairness concerns, each of
which is only relevant in the context of a party seeking compensation
for postpetition injuries. First, the Court worried about imposing the
costs of the arrangement on innocent parties.51 The Court recognized
that absent a governmentally sanctioned arrangement, the debtor
likely would have already lost the real estate to a solvent claimant
through state debt-collection law, and thus a fire such as this one
could be compensated for by insurance and the new owner's assets.52
The concern was not that the arrangement in any way made the
debtor more dangerous, but that it represented a governmental
commenced. See id. at 473-74. The importance of the administrative expense priority for the
tort claimants was simple: if the tort claimants were granted administrative expense priority,
they would completely exhaust the very limited resources of the estate to the detriment of
prepetition unsecured creditors and the United States government which held a tax claim; but if
the claimants were denied administrative expense priority, then the liquidated estate would be
distributed entirely to the United States and to the unsecured creditors. For purposes of this
litigation, both sides stipulated that the receiver's negligence caused the fire damages to the tort
claimants. See id. at 474.
46. In developing its fairness-based rationale for granting administrative expense priority
for the tort claims, the Court noted that while the estate clearly did not benefit from the tort
claims, it was seeking to benefit from the continued operations that led to the stipulated tort.
See id. at 478-79. But under prior case law, courts had used the more conventional meaning of
benefit, under which a tort claim would not qualify. See supra Part II.A.
47. See Reading, 391 U.S. at 485.
48. "In our view the trustee has overlooked one important, and here decisive, statutory
objective: fairness to all persons having claims against an insolvent." Id. at 477.
49. Id. at 482.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 478.
52. See id. at 482.
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decision to allow continued operations with full knowledge that those
injured in these operations would have zero recovery. 53 This fairness
concern disappears if no party is injured by the estate; in such
circumstances, by definition no costs of the bankruptcy proceeding are
imposed on innocent creditors.
The Court's second specific fairness concern regarded the bal-
ancing of interests between prepetition and postpetition creditors.
The Court realized that postpetition tort claimants, if denied adminis-
trative expense priority in a liquidation, would be entirely foreclosed
from recovery for their injuries.M To avoid such a result, the Court
reasoned that- prepetition creditors hope that continued operation
during the arrangement will eventually return the debtor to solvency
and lead to full payment of the debtor's obligations.5s Based upon this
concept of relative control and benefit, without regard for the credi-
tors' actual level of control, the Court concluded that it was more just
for prepetition creditors to bear the cost of postpetition torts.5 6
This second fairness concern loses its force if there are no
injured postpetition parties. It is easy to see the fairness of making
the parties who stood to gain from continued operations pay for inju-
ries suffered as a result of those operations. It is much less clear,
however, why an uninjured postpetition creditor should recover ahead
of-and potentially to the exclusion of-all prepetition creditors,
regardless of the prepetition creditors' injuries or their lack of control
over the estate's conduct.
Thus Reading's facts, its holding, and the Court's analysis of
specific fairness concerns all point to compensatory fairness as the
driving principle in the case. Where a party has been injured by the
estate, it is more just to prioritize that party's claims over the claims
of prepetition creditors who would benefit from continued operations.
But applying or extending the holding from Reading to circumstances
where the postpetition creditor has suffered no injury could lead to
results manifestly at odds with the very fairness concerns that
motivated the Court to grant priority in Reading.5
53. See id. at 478.
54. See id. at 481 ("a tort claim arising during an arrangement, like a tort claim arising
during a bankruptcy proceeding proper, is not provable as a general claim in the bankruptcy").
Even the receiver recognized that a tort claimant "ought to have some means of asserting its
claim against the business whose operation resulted in the fire," but the Court rejected the
receiver's alternative suggestions as unsatisfactory and without statutory support. I&. at 479.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 479. The key to understanding the majority's concern is to grasp that either
the prepetition or postpetition creditors will exhaust the estate assets, while the other group
will be burdened with the entire loss.
57. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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C. 28 U.S.C. § 959 and the Competitive Neutrality
Exception to the Benefit Requirement
After Reading, the definition of actual and necessary costs
entitled to administrative expense priority included costs that benefit
the estate and costs which should receive administrative expense
priority under the compensatory fairness principle enunciated in
Reading. The Court thus indicated a willingness, under appropriate
circumstances, to exercise the judiciary's interpretive powers to define
actual and necessary costs based upon the policy considerations un-
derlying bankruptcy law. The Eleventh Circuit has developed an-
other exception arising out of the fairness concerns underlying 28
U.S.C. § 959.58
Section 959(b) requires that trustees and debtors in possession
"manage and operate the property [of the estate] according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is
situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof
would be bound to do if in possession thereof."59 This section simply
confirms that bankruptcy does not shield trustees or debtors in pos-
session from the operation of valid6 state laws.61 In addition, section
58. See Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining), 963 F.2d
1449 (11th Cir. 1992). N.P. Mining is a postpetition punitive fine case, and as such will be
discussed in greater detail infra Part IH.B. Here, however, the case is important in describing
the second court-developed exception to the benefit requirement for actual and necessary costs
entitled to administrative expense priority.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1994).
60. The phrase "valid state laws" merely points out the fact that section 959(b) is not a
blanket enforcer of all state laws. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, any
state law that conflicts with a Bankruptcy Code provision (or other federal law) is preempted.
See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 656 (1971) (invalidating a state law that required payment
of discharged tort obligations prior to reinstatement of a driver's license; holding codified at 11
U.S.C. § 525(a) (1994)); Brenningmeyer, supra note 22, at 512 ('[U]nder preemption analysis the
Code must prevail over contradictory state legislation."); Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts
Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 403, 407 n.16 (1987)
("The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, cl.2, requires that
bankruptcy law preempt any state laws that are in conflict with it.").
61. The Supreme Court has expressed this same policy in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274
(1985): "[We do not question that anyone in possession of the site... must comply with the
environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a
nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Id.
at 285. Because noncompliance with state environmental laws can lead to the imposition of
punitive fines, this passage has been cited as support for granting administrative expense
priority for postpetition punitive fines. See In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827, 830 (D. Kan.
1991).
As will be discussed in great detail below with regard to section 959, the passage
above-and the policy of requiring compliance with all valid state laws-does not speak to the
issue of administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive fines. See infra Part III.B.
The existence and priority of an obligation are separate questions-the obligation to comply is a
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959 seeks to insure that bankruptcy does not provide a competitively
advantageous haven from which the debtor can continue to operate
while avoiding costly and onerous regulatory requirements that its
competitors must observe. This principle is referred to in this Note as
competitive neutrality.62
In In re N.P. Mining, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the
competitive neutrality principle to craft another category of actual
and necessary costs entitled to administrative expense priority.6 N.P.
Mining involved a request by the State of Alabama for administrative
expense priority for postpetition punitive fines imposed for violations
of Alabama strip mining statutes.6 These fines were not beneficial to
the estate, and so did not qualify for administrative expense priority
under the traditional benefit requirement. Nor, as the court recog-
nized, did the compensatory fairness principle of Reading apply to
such punitive fines.65 The court therefore considered whether some
other judicially recognized bankruptcy policy mandated priority for
these fines. The court found this policy consideration in the section
959 competitive neutrality principle: because a nonbankrupt party
would have to abide by the law and pay the fines, and because
denying administrative expense priority would give the debtor a
competitive advantage, the court granted administrative expense
priority for the fines.66
The court in N.P. Mining cited liberally to Reading, and ulti-
mately couched its holding in language from the Reading decision.
The court also noted, however, that the central holding of
Reading-"a policy of fairness to persons injured by the estate!--did
not apply to noncompensatory postpetition claims. 67 The N.P. Mining
approach to administrative expense priority, based upon the section
959 competitive neutrality principle, represents a second separate
product of non-bankruptcy law, while the bankruptcy priority assigned to punitive fines arising
from noncompliance is a question for bankruptcy law. See supra note 1. As discussed infra Part
IH.B.2, the state and federal governments have numerous other tools to insure compliance with
state laws.
62. See In re White Crane Trading Co., 170 B.R. 694, 702 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) ("The
purpose of bankruptcy is not to permit debtors or non-debtors to wrest competitive advantage by
exempting themselves from the myriad of laws that regulate business."); Brenningmeyer, supra
note 22, at 509 ("[TIhe Code was not intended ... to give debtors a competitive advantage in the
marketplace.").
63. 963 F.2d at 1450.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1456.
66. See id. at 1458.
67. Id. at 1456 (quoting Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 484 (1968)) (citation omitted).
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exception to the benefit requirement for actual and necessary costs.68
Three courts subsequently addressing this same issue have declared
that N.P. Mining controls, and have therefore granted administrative
expense priority for postpetition noncompensatory claims based on
the section 959 competitive neutrality principle.69 These decisions
have not discussed the compensatory fairness principle of Reading,
and thus continue the distinction between the compensatory fairness
and competitive neutrality principles as separate bases for
administrative expense priority.
Thus after N.P. Mining, three judicially developed categories of
postpetition costs fall within the definition of actual and necessary
expenses: (1) obligations that benefit the estate; (2) compensatory
claims of those injured by the continued operations of the estate; and
(3) claims that should receive priority in order to insure competitive
neutrality in bankruptcy.
III. CURRENT PRIORITY TREATMENT OF POSTPETITION
PUNITIVE FINES IN BANKRUPTCY
Although Reading concerned only compensatory claims, later
courts have drawn on Reading in addressing priority for punitive
fines. Courts that have directly considered this issue 0 have granted
priority for postpetition punitive fines,'71 basing their decisions on one
68. Note that Reading and its compensatory fairness progeny would be decided the same
way under the competitive neutrality principle. Judge-made tort law is as much valid state law
as are statutes. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Thus the presumptively negli-
gent receiver in Reading violated valid state law-and hence section 959-to the same degree as
did the mine operator in N.P. Mining.
Competitive neutrality is a separate exception to the benefit requirement only in the sense
that there are postpetition claims that would fail the Reading test but nonetheless could be
granted administrative expense priority based upon competitive neutrality (e.g., postpetition
punitive fines, the subject of this Note).
69. See Kentucky v. Karst Robbins Coal Co., No. 94-335, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6296, at
*6 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 1995) ("The controlling case is In re N.P. Mining Co."); In re Double B
Distribs., Inc., 176 B.R. 271, 273 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("This case is controlled by In re N.P.
Mining Co."); In re Motel Investments, Inc., 172 B.R. 105, 107 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("The
Court agrees that N.P. [Mining] is controlling in this case.").
70. Several courts have declared rules regarding administrative expense priority for
postpetition punitive fines in cases where such fines were not at issue. See, e.g., Leavell v.
Karnes, 143 B.R. 212, 219 (S.D. Ill. 1990) (declaring without analysis, in a case that did not
directly concern priority for postpetition punitive fines, that '[i]t follows that any fines, penalties
or cleanup costs caused by a trustee's violation of environmental laws during the operation of a
business should also be considered administrative expenses.").
71. Despite these decisions, the issue is not entirely settled. Only three Courts of Appeals
have addressed the issue directly, and each court has used a different rationale for granting
administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive fines. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v.
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of two rationales. Two courts have based their decisions directly on
Reading, extending its holding to noncompensatory claims.72 The
remaining courts have recognized that Reading is inapplicable in the
punitive context, but instead have granted priority based upon the
competitive neutrality principle underlying 28 U.S.C. § 959.73
This section explores and critiques the two rationales that
have been used to grant administrative expense priority for postpeti-
tion punitive fines. While the pure Reading rationale is difficult to
accept in the absence of the compensatory concerns fundamental to
Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 116 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1997) (giving fine administrative
status because "it would be fundamentally unfair to allow [appellant] to flout [the state's]
environmental protection laws and escape paying a penalty for such behavior."); In re N.P.
Mining, 963 F.2d 1449 (discussed infra Part mI.B); United States v. Elliott (In re Elkins
Energy), 761 F.2d 168, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Subjecting the estate to postpetition penalty
claims will encourage the creditors to ensure that the debtor is complying with the law while at
the same time ensuring that violations of law do not go unpunished."). In other words, the
circuits that have considered the issue have not developed any consensus on the meaning of
Reading in the context of postpetition punitive fines.
Finally, while the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue directly, courts there have
generated rumblings of discontent with the expansive reading of administrative expenses. See
Gull Indus., Inc. v. John Mitchell, Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386, 388 (B-AP. 9th Cir. 1994)
(declaring that administrative expenses must "directly and substantially benefit the estate" but
expressly declining to address this heightened benefit requirement because the case could
clearly be decided on the separate timing issue); In re Lazar, 207 B.R. 668, 685 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1997) ("[blenefit to the estate must be measurable in assets distributable to creditors, or the
elimination of claims which would otherwise require creditors to share the assets with others").
72. See Cumberland Farms, 116 F.3d at 20; In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827, 830 (D.
Kan. 1991).
73. See N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458; Karst Robbins, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6296 at *6;
In re Double B Distribs., 176 B.R. at 273; In re Motel Investments, 172 B.R. at 107. United
States v. Elliott (In r6 Elkins Energy), 761 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985)-which was actually the first
case decided on the issue-likewise granted administrative expense priority for postpetition
punitive fines, but "offer[ed] no explanation" for its decision to grant priority. See N.P. Mining,
963 F.2d at 1459. Close examination suggests that the Elliott court used an argument that later
developed into both of the distinct rationales employed by courts in considering administrative
expense priority for postpetition punitive fines.
The primary issue in Elliott was whether postpetition punitive fines were disallowed under
section 57(j) of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 57(j) arguably disallowed both prepetition and
postpetition punitive fines. Based upon the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence allowing
claims for postpetition tax penalties, however, the court concluded that section 57(j) only applied
to prepetition penalties, and that postpetition penalties were allowed. See Elliott, 761 F.2d at
171.
The court went on to grant administrative expense priority for these allowed fines. See id.
at 172. The court's arguments for allowing the claims, though, suggest that the principles
behind both Reading and section 959 may have informed the decision to grant administrative
expense priority. On one hand, the court was concerned that, as in Reading, the estate was
acting wrongly while being operated for the benefit of the creditors. See id. at 171. On the
other hand, the court was also concerned with the ability of the debtor to enhance the
profitability of its operations by failing to comply with regulatory statutes. See id. This concern
clearly foreshadowed the section 959 competitive neutrality argument advanced by later courts
to justify administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive fines. See id. Both of these
concerns likely influenced the court's decision to grant administrative expense priority. Each
rationale is discussed in detail in the following sections.
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the Reading decision, the section 959 rationale raises a compelling
point. The critique of this rationale sets the stage for the discussion
of an alternative approach that reconciles Reading's notion of
compensatory fairness with section 959's principle of competitive
neutrality.
A. Reading and Postpetition Punitive Fines
Two courts have extended Reading to postpetition punitive
fines. In In re Bill's Coal Co., the district court summarized Reading
as "suggest[ing] that 'actual and necessary costs' should include costs
ordinarily incident to operation of a business."74 The court reasoned
that punitive fines are ordinarily incident to regulated mining opera-
tions and should therefore receive administrative expense priority7s
In Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, the court likewise granted administrative expense priority
for postpetition punitive fines based on the "costs ordinarily incident"
language from Reading, noting in passing but not relying on the
Reading Court's compensatory fairness concerns.76
Remarkably, the courts in these cases adopted the Reading
"costs ordinarily incident" language without regard for the
compensatory fairness issues that form the factual and policy basis of
Reading. The court in In re Bill's Coal did not mention fairness
concerns when discussing Reading or in deciding the case at hand.77
The court did not even consider the fairness implications of prioritiz-
ing punitive fines above compensatory claims78-an issue that other
courts granting administrative expense priority have acknowledged is
a fimdamental fairness concern.79
74. 124 B.R. 827, 830 (D. Kan. 1991) (quoting Reading, 391 U.S. at 483).
75. See id.
76. 116 F.3d 16, 20 (st Cir. 1997) ("[T]he payment of a fine for failing, during bankruptcy,
to meet the requirements of Florida environmental protection laws is a cost 'ordinarily incident
to operation of a business' in light of today's extensive environmental regulations").
77. 124 B.R. at 829-30.
78. As discussed supra note 1, administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive
fines in a case where the estate is ultimately liquidated punishes the prepetition creditors
(regardless of whether they were culpable or not), rather than the culpable debtor in possession.
The court in In re Bill's Coal lost sight of the core debt-collection function of "decid[ing] rights
among creditors when there are not enough assets to go around," JACKSON, supra note 1, at 4,
and confused the government versus debtor regulatory relationship with the Chapter 7
government-as-creditor versus non-governmental creditor relationship. See JACKSON, supra at
1, at 8; Heidt, Undermining Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 628-29; Hilsen, supra note 1, at 284.
79. See, e.g., N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1456 ("A policy of fairness to persons injured by the
estate, therefore, does not dictate that the postpetition penalties levied [here] receive first
priority.").
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In Cumberland Farms, the court twice noted the importance of
compensatory fairness in Reading. In discussing Reading, the court
acknowledged the "decisive statutory objective [of] fairness to all
persons having claims against the insolvent," and also recognized the
"grave financial injury" suffered by the Reading petitioners.8° In
considering the First Circuit's subsequent application of Reading, the
court noted that "[wle have recognized a special category of expenses
entitled to administrative priority status, based on considerations of
fundamental fairness, see Reading, consisting of amounts due entities
'injured by the debtor-in-possession's operation of the
business ..... 81 But the court then proceeded to decide the case
without regard for and with no discussion of the deviation from both
the facts and policy of Reading.82 The court closed the opinion by
invoking fairness: "It would be fundamentally unfair to allow [debtor]
to flout Florida's environmental protection laws and escape paying a
penalty for such behavior."83 This type of fairness, however, was not
at issue in Reading, and the court never explains why postpetition
punitive claimants should have priority over prepetition compensa-
tory claimants.84
Granting administrative expense priority for postpetition
punitive fines based upon Reading has one glaring problem: In a
world where bankruptcy debtors rarely pay all obligations in full,
every dollar allocated to pay a punitive fine as an administrative
expense takes a dollar away from prepetition creditors (including
parties who have suffered compensable tort injuries). A grievously
injured prepetition creditor 85 could find the entire estate--and her
80. Cumberland Farms, 116 F.3d at 20.
81. Id. at 21 (quoting Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc., (In re Mammoth Mart), 536 F.2d
950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976)).
82. Id. ("We hold that the present case does come within the ambit of Reading and
Charlesbank.").
83. Id. This concern with fairness to competitors of the debtor is certainly important, at
least in the context of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization. See infra Part HI.B.3. But this
fairness concern was not at issue in Reading. Judicial recognition of this competitive neutrality
fairness principle represents a distinct and new category of administrative expense priority from
what was developed in Reading.
84. See id.
85. The quintessential "injured creditor" is of course a tort victim. When comparing com-
pensatory and punitive claims, however, a contract creditor can be "injured" just as much as a
tort creditor. If debtor fails to deliver the automobile that creditor has purchased and paid for,
creditor has a consensual contract claim for $10,000; if debtor instead delivers the car but the
next day negligently collides with the car, totaling it, creditor has a non-consensual tort claim
for $10,000 (assuming no depreciation). Creditor is equally injured under either scenario.
Compensatory damages become a legally recognized common denominator, and for purposes of
comparing priorities between compensatory and punitive claims, consensual contract creditors
and non-consensual tort creditors are similarly situated.
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entire recovery-exhausted by state punitive fines for violations that
did not harm anyone.86 This result is not far-fetched or theoretical: in
Elliott, Cumberland Farms, and N.P. Mining, parties who suffered
compensable prepetition injuries walked away with a lessened
recovery because postpetition punitive fines were granted
administrative expense priority. While there is a need for
administrative expense priority for expenses that actually benefit the
estate or in situations where the reorganizing estate harms someone,
86. This problem can be particularly prominent in the context of punitive environmental
fines. Because of the technical complexity and continuing nature of environmental violations,
see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.161, 403.141 (West 1997), fines and penalties completely
unrelated to compensation can overwhelm an estate. See Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v.
N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining), 963 F.2d 1449, 1450 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that
because of the continuing nature of environmental fines, "initially small fines for minor
infractions can balloon into large fines."); David P. Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CI-u.
L. REV. 27, 64 (1981) ("[E]ven a small sum, compounded daily, may mount up significantly over
time."). In one recent case, the postpetition punitive fines totaled $193,914,000, see In re Lazar,
207 B.R. 668, 672 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997); in Cumberland Farms, 116 F.3d at 20, penalties
could have been set as high as $647,000,000.
Administrative expense priority for such large sums raises the very real possibility of gov-
ernmental units absorbing the entirety of a bankrupt estate to the detriment of general
creditors, including individuals actually harmed by the debtor's wrongdoing. Cf United States
v. Johns-Manville, 18 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1177, 1181 (D.N.H. 1982) (recognizing in the
context of the automatic stay the conflict between compensatory claims from injured parties and
remedial claims from governmental units). At the extreme, administrative expense priority for
punitive fines could lead to such inequities as a prepetition creditor dying of cancer from
groundwater contamination receiving nothing while the state receives the entire estate for
harmless prepetition violations of, for example, an insurance filing requirement.
States would respond that such punitive fines prevent future violations that may lead to
actual injury. Thus a state would argue that calling an insurance filing violation "harmless"
misses the entire benefit of having such a regulation. This argument is entirely true in a
successful Chapter 11 reorganization-we do not want these debtors to "roll the dice" in bank-
ruptcy, knowing that if they lose the estate's resources will be wholly inadequate to compensate
for the harms they produce, but that if they win the fines will be discharged. See infra Part
HI.B.3. But in the case of Chapter 7 liquidations or failed Chapter 11 reorganizations converted
to liquidations, this answer fails; the only question in these cases is who gets the money-the
parties actually harmed, or the government as an unharmed claimant.
Administrative expense priority for postpetition noncompensatory fines also raises the
possibility of strategic revenue-raising behavior by state environmental authorities. Presently,
many state environmental compliance oversight programs rely on noncompensatory fines and
penalties for funding. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-201-101 and 102 (1997) (establishing the
Environmental Protection Fund into which all environmental civil penalties are deposited, and
specifying that "[t]he fund shall be available to the department of environment and conservation
to help defray the costs of administering [environmental] regulatory programs [such as] permit-
ting, monitoring, investigation, enforcement, and administration of the department's
functions... including the payment of salaries and benefits to employees administering the
regulatory programs"). The opportunity to move compliance fines to the top of the priority list
creates an incentive for state agencies to target bankrupt debtors for extraordinary compliance
oversight (far beyond what is required for the immediate protection of human health and the
environment). While such strategic behavior would be legal, it is detrimental to innocent
general creditors, and it also distorts normal compliance oversight priorities. Cf Sward, supra
note 60, at 434 (noting strategic disincentives to the state to undertake cleanup efforts).
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fairness and justice suggest that administrative expense priority
should not be granted when the expense did not benefit the estate or
compensate anyone for a loss.
B. Section 959 and Postpetition Punitive Fines
The court in N.P. Mining understood that punitive fines do not
raise a Reading compensatory fairness issue. The court noted that
Reading sought the "natural and just" result in the context of the
"statutory objective of 'fairness to all persons having claims against
the insolvent.' "87 The court explained that this fairness concern did
not apply in the instant case, however, because punitive fines did not
represent compensation for any injury. A policy of fairness to persons
injured by the estate, therefore, did not dictate that. the postpetition
penalties receive first priority. In fact, the court noted, punitive
penalties historically have been disfavored by the Code for fairness
reasons.88
Instead, the N.P. Mining court granted the punitive fines ad-
ministrative expense priority based on Section 959.89 Because a
nonbankrupt party would have to pay the fines, 90 and because denying
administrative expense priority would give the debtor a competitive
advantage, the court concluded that priority was appropriate to en-
sure the trustee's compliance with state law.91
87. N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477, 482
(1968)).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 1458 ("Appellant raises another federal policy [section 959], one that we hold
does justify giving first priority to punitive penalties .... ").
90. This narrow version of the section 959 argument is by itself difficult to support in light
of the many ways in which bankruptcy alters the debtor's relationships with different parties.
See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay), 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Here we
encounter a bankruptcy statute that is intended to override many provisions of law that would
apply in the absence of bankruptcy-especially laws otherwise providing creditors suing
promptly with full payment of their claims."). Bankruptcy is replete with circumstances where
the bankruptcy debtor is treated differently than it would be in the exact same circumstances
outside of bankruptcy; this different treatment is the point of petitioning for bankruptcy. For
example, a nonbankrupt entity cannot receive protection from an act to create, perfect, or
enforce a lien; nor can it avoid the consequences of an executory lease or collective bargaining
agreement; nor can it force a payment plan on an unwilling individual creditor. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362(a)(4), 365, 1113, 1129(b)(1). Bankruptcy fundamentally alters, at least in the immediate
term, the estate's dealings with its general and secured creditors, its employees, its contractual
partners, and its tort victims. See Warren, supra note 1, at 786.
91. See N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458. The N.P. Mining court recognized one important
limitation on these administrative expenses arising from section 959: because section 959
requires that the estate be operated and managed in compliance with valid state law, the court
only granted administrative expense priority for punitive fines incurred for actions taken while
the bankrupt business was actually being operated or managed. Id. at 1460-61. The mere
existence of a noncompliant estate is not sufficient grounds for liability under section 959, and
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Three courts subsequently addressing this same issue have
declared that N.P. Mining controls, and have therefore granted ad-
ministrative expense priority for postpetition punitive fines based on
the section 959 competitive neutrality principle.92 These cases have
refined the N.P. Mining "operation" limit to administrative expense
priority, but have otherwise not broken any new ground on the scope
of actual and necessary costs entitled to administrative expense prior-
ity.
1. Priority Violates the Compensatory Fairness
Principle of Reading
While N.P. Mining and its progeny may not rely directly on
Reading to support their holdings, the granting of administrative
expense priority for postpetition punitive fines in these cases violates
the compensatory fairness principle of Reading. As discussed above
in the context of In re Bill's Coal and Cumberland Farms, every dollar
paid in full to postpetition punitive fines decreases the amount avail-
able for distribution to prepetition claimants, including those actually
injured or otherwise owed compensation by the debtor.93 Thus the
competitive neutrality principle used in N.P. Mining conflicts with the
Reading Court's fairness principle. For this reason, the competitive
neutrality rationale is questionable unless it provides some significant
advantage in terms of effectuating some other important bankruptcy
policy.
2. Priority is Not Required to Ensure Compliance
with State Laws
The facially obvious policy behind section 959 is the require-
ment that bankruptcy estates comply with valid state laws.
Technically, administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive
fines is required to insure that bankruptcy estates are operated in
compliance with all state laws. 94 But as discussed above,95 this is a
therefore is not sufficient to accord administrative expense priority to punitive fines levied for
this noncompliance. See Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969, 971 (2d Cir. 1932).
92. See Kentucky v. Karst Robbins Coal Co., No. 94-335, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6296, at
*6 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 1995) (mThe controlling case is In re N.P. Mining Co."); In re Double B
Distribs., Inc., 176 B.R. 271, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("This case is controlled by In re N.P.
Mining Co."); In re Motel Investments, Inc., 172 B.R. 105, 107 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("The
Court agrees that N.P. [Mining] is controlling in this case.").
93. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
94. See N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458.
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hopelessly narrow way of asking the question; it ignores the many
ways in which estates in bankruptcy operate differently than entities
outside bankruptcy. The more appropriate question is whether states
can enforce their laws absent administrative expense priority for
these fines. In other words, if administrative expense priority is
denied for postpetition punitive fines, will debtors in possession
"flout" state laws,96 "cut[ting] costs by ignoring safety and environ-
mental violations"?97
Section 959 merely recognizes that a debtor may not shirk the
responsibilities of valid state laws while in bankruptcy. Section 959
does not substantively favor all state laws over bankruptcy law, and
in fact, bankruptcy law preempts state law if they conflict. Therefore
the question is really about the degree to which the state would be
able to enforce its laws without administrative expense priority for
postpetition punitive fines. If courts deny administrative expense
priority for postpetition punitive fines, states will still have several
tools available to compel compliance with their laws, and these tools
are just as capable of insuring compliance and of proactively deterring
noncompliance by debtors in possession.98
First, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code, nor anything inherent
in the denial of administrative expense priority for punitive fines,
stops the state from seeking injunctive relief against the debtor in
possession or trustee for noncompliance with state law.99 Section
95. See supra note 90.
96. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 116 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir.
1997).
97. N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1458.
98. This Note is not suggesting that debtors in possession currently comply with all appli-
cable laws, nor that state enforcement tools are sufficient to insure such compliance. The point
is that debtors in possession will be no less likely to comply if administrative expense priority
for postpetition punitive fines were taken out of the state's enforcement quiver. Removing this
tool creates no new incentives for either the debtor or the creditors to favor noncompliance; nor
would the state be any less capable of detecting, stopping, and deterring such noncompliance.
The primary benefit to the state of priority for punitive fines is fiscal rather than substantive.
In light of this fact, the wisdom of a law that gives the state a weapon that punishes prepetition
creditors regardless of their culpability, and yet has only marginal benefit in terms of actual
deterrence or enforcement, is questionable.
99. Further, denying administrative expense priority for punitive fines in Chapter 7
liquidations does not reduce the efficacy of these fines in deterring noncompliance by the
Chapter 11 debtor in possession or trustee. As will be discussed further below, if the Chapter 11
reorganization succeeds, postpetition punitive fines should be granted administrative expense
priority based upon the competitive neutrality principle. For the reorganization plan to be
confirmed, all administrative expenses must be paid in fill in cash by the effective date of the
plan unless otherwise agreed. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1994). Thus as postpetition
punitive fines mount during the Chapter 11 proceeding, the possibility of successfully
reemerging becomes vanishingly small. See McBain, supra note 11, at 242. The debtor in pos-
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959(a) expressly authorizes suit, without leave of the appointing
court, against trustees and debtors in possession for actions under-
taken in carrying on the business. 1°° Further, nothing in the auto-
matic stay provision limits or stays any suit against the trustee or
debtor in possession for injunctive relief relating to the operation of
the estate.1°1 Once the state has obtained injunctive relief against the
debtor in possession or trustee, continued violation of the state
laws-and thus violation of the injunction-can be remedied by way of
a contempt of court proceeding against the debtor in possession or the
trustee.0 2 Because such a contempt proceeding can result in both
fines and jail time for the recalcitrant party, this technique is a
powerful weapon for the enforcement of obligations within
bankruptcy. 103
Second, the Bankruptcy Code provides for removal of the
debtor in possession for cause. Section 1104(a)(1) grants the court the
discretionary power to remove the debtor in possession and appoint a
trustee for cause.' °4 Thus if the debtor in possession fails to comply
with state laws, the state as a party in interest can petition the court
for appointment of a trustee. Because trustees displace current
management and thus generally provide less probability of successful
Chapter 11 reorganization, 0 5 the threat to appoint a trustee provides
additional incentive to the debtor in possession to comply with state
law.
session, to the extent that it opted for Chapter 11 in hopes of reorganizing, has no incentive to
let postpetition punitive fines mount, because this makes successful reorganization impossible.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1994).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). For that matter, nothing in section 362 stays an action
to impose monetary liability on the estate for postpetition actions. Section 362(a) stays eight
categories of action by all entities. Five of these, paragraphs (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7), are by their
terms expressly limited to claims, actions, proceedings, or judgments arising before the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case (and in paragraph (1), that could have been commenced
before the bankruptcy petition). Paragraph (3) stays any act to obtain possession or control of
property of or from the estate; paragraph (4) stays any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien
against property of the estate; and paragraph (8) stays all proceedings concerning the debtor
before the United States Tax Court.
Thus when postpetition conduct by the debtor in possession or trustee violates state law, the
state is not stayed from actions seeking either monetary or injunctive relief. If both monetary
and injunctive relief are obtained, the state can proceed to enforce the injunctive relief during
the pendency of the bankruptcy; but enforcement of a monetary judgment will be stayed during
the bankruptcy proceeding under section 362(a)(3) and (4).
102. See CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 11A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2960 (2d
ed. 1995).
103. One writer has compared injunctive relief to a criminal statute drafted and enforced
on behalf of and to the specific requirements of a civil litigant. See OWEN FIss, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION 35 (1978).
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
105. See Miller & Ryland, supra note 27, at 209.
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Finally, in many industries the state has the straightforward
power to seek either a court or administrative order shutting down
the operations of any entity operating within the state in violation of
health and safety laws.10 6 This power is the ultimate incentive for
debtors in possession to comply with state health and safety laws.
Although an extreme response, it is particularly appropriate in the
context of bankruptcy estates, where the debtor in possession may
have additional incentives for noncompliance in a last-ditch attempt
to save the business from liquidation.
These tools together provide the state with ample machinery to
enforce compliance with state laws even in the absence of administra-
tive expense priority for postpetition punitive fines. The "importance"
to compliance efforts of granting priority to punitive fines is really
twofold: (1) they are admittedly the easiest way for the state to pres-
sure a business to comply;1°7 and (2) many state regulatory organiza-
tions rely upon the funds generated by these fines for ongoing opera-
tions, including the funding of salaries and benefits, creating an
incentive for state agencies to favor fines regardless of whether they
are strictly necessary to enforce compliance. 0 8 While there is nothing
wrong with this tendency, it bears noticing that such fines are not
necessary for compliance-they are merely expeditious and
advantageous to the state.0 9 Administrative expense priority for
106. See, e.g., Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining), 963
F.2d 1449, 1459 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The ASMC has as one of its remedies the right to secure an
administrative or court order mandating cessation of the operation of a mine by an operator who
violates any of the provisions of the mining act and regulations.").
107. See, e.g., Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 692 (1966) (quoting Boteler v. Ingels,
308 U.S. 57, 61 (1939)) ("[I]f the trustee were exempt from the [tax] penalty, a 'State... would
be denied the traditional and almost universal method of enforcing prompt payment.).
108. See supra note 86.
109. This expeditiousness and advantage may be sufficient to support administrative
expense priority for these fines. In the context of tax fines, the Supreme Court has granted
administrative expense priority based partially on the benefits to the state of having this tool
available. See Nicholas, 384 U.S. at 692; Boteler, 308 U.S. at 61.
On the other hand, these tax decisions may rest on unique provisions not applicable in non-
tax contexts. See 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1994). Section 960 subjects the business in bankruptcy to ap-
plicable taxes 'to the same extent" as solvent businesses, and section 6659(a)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code in effect at the time of Nicholas and Boteler provided that penalties on taxes
"shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes." I.R.C. § 6659(aX1) (1964)
(repealed 1989). Reading the statutes together, a tax penalty becomes in operation part of the
tax liability, and the use of "extent" in section 960 indicates that overall quantitative tax
liability may not be reduced by virtue of presence in bankruptcy. These particular wordings are
not present in the context of environmental and other punitive fines. Further, this holding may
simply be part of the general judicial deference to tax penalties (rather than to all penalties).
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 28, at 255, 277 (recognizing that the Bankruptcy Code
intentionally and systematically prefers government taxing authorities over other creditors in
order to "minimize[ I losses to the public fisc" and to internalize costs of business failures to
parties dealing with the debtor). But see United Stayes v. Elliott (In re Elkins Energy), 761 F.2d
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postpetition punitive fines should be evaluated for its effects on the
purposes and results of the bankruptcy process, rather than uni-
formly favored simply because it is a fiscally beneficial compliance
tool.
3. Priority is Required in the Chapter 11 Context
to Ensure No Competitive Advantage
In adopting section 959, Congress sought to insure that bank-
ruptcy did not become a haven in which debtors could gain advantage
over competitors by shirking onerous regulatory requirements. 110 If a
Chapter 11 reorganization is dismissed or converted to a Chapter 7
liquidation, there will be no violation of the competitive neutrality
principle: dismissal will not discharge the punitive fines,"' and in a
conversion to Chapter 7, postpetition expenses that are not granted
administrative expense priority become claims against the Chapter 7
estate."2
If the Chapter 11 debtor successfully emerges from bank-
ruptcy, however, postpetition punitive fines are discharged without
receiving any payment under the reorganization plan. A holder of a
postpetition claim against the estate is not a statutory creditor 3 and
thus cannot file a claim and participate in the Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion plan; but at the same time, "the confirmation of a plan discharges
the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirma-
tion."114
168, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejecting any distinction among tax and non-tax penalties based
upon being tax-related or not).
110. See In re White Crane Trading Co., 170 B.R. 694, 702 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994);
Brenningmeyer, supra note 22, at 509.
111. Upon dismissal, estate property re-vests in the debtor, and the state can enforce and
collect the fines against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 349, 362(c) (1994).
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1994). Note that if the Chapter 11 reorganization is converted
to a Chapter 7 liquidation, there is no competitive advantage concern associated with fines
during either the Chapter 11 or 7 proceedings, because the debtor will not emerge as an opera-
tive entity.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) defines "creditor" as used in the statute (as opposed to common
usage). With certain exceptions discussed above, this definition excludes postpetition creditors
from status as "creditors" under the Bankruptcy Code, thus denying them the right to partake
in the bankruptcy distribution.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1994). Thus under the plain language of section 1141(dXl), a
postpetition, pre-confirmation claim not accorded administrative expense priority is wiped clean
unless preserved in the plan or order confirming the plan. While Chapter 11 creditors are free
to vote for a plan that pays postpetition punitive fines, it is difficult to imagine why they would
lower their own distributions by doing so. In the absence of such a voluntary move, postpetition
but pre-confirmation fines will not receive a distribution under the plan but will nonetheless be
discharged under section 1141(d) upon confirmation of the Chapter 11 reorganization plan.
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Under this statutory regime, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession
could actually benefit from its failure to comply with onerous
regulatory burdens so long as noncompliance does not harm another
party. If the debtor emerges from bankruptcy, all punitive fines
incurred during the reorganization and not accorded administrative
expense priority will be wiped clean, giving the debtor in possession a
significant short-term advantage. Section 959 was fashioned to
counteract this circumstance. Further, where the punitive fines are
designed to punish wrongful conduct and deter similar behavior in the
future," 5 it makes sense to grant priority to such punitive fines in a
successful Chapter 11 reorganization because these fines punish the
correct party.
The effect of section 1141(d)(1)(A)-discharging postpetition
expenses that do not receive administrative expense priority-stands
as a major policy impediment to simply denying administrative
expense priority outright for postpetition punitive fines. Instead, the
courts must consider alternatives to outright administrative expense
priority for postpetition punitive fines, measuring these alternatives
by their fidelity to section 503(b) and the Bankruptcy Code as a whole,
and by their practical effects in effectuating the objectives of
bankruptcy law.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TO ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE PRIORITY FOR
POSTPETITION PuNITivE FINES
A reinterpretation of the meaning and scope of the Supreme
Court's decision in Reading suggests an alternative that would allow
courts to satisfy both the compensatory fairness concern of Reading
and the competitive neutrality concern underlying section 959.
A. An Outcome-Sensitive Priority Model
Reading suggested that actual and necessary costs consist of
costs tangibly benefitting the estate, and also non-beneficial costs
when for fairness reasons it would simply be inequitable not to grant
administrative expense priority. Fairness and justice were the
central landmarks of Reading; while these concepts may have been
115. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (quoting
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)) ("Punitive damages 'are not compensation
for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct
and to deter its future occurrence.-).
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left ill-defined, they are exactly the concepts that courts must grapple
with to determine what claims are entitled to administrative expense
priority.
Reading and its progeny reveal two fairness principles to con-
sider when determining which claims will receive administrative
expense priority as actual and necessary costs: compensatory fairness
and competitive neutrality. Having identified the two primary fair-
ness principles, application of Reading becomes straightforward. If a
postpetition cost benefits the estate, grant administrative expense
priority as an actual and necessary expense. But if the postpetition
cost does not benefit the estate, grant administrative expense priority
only if denying priority would violate either compensatory fairness or
competitive neutrality.
If a Chapter 11 debtor in possession incurs a postpetition puni-
tive fine, this fine does not benefit the debtor in possession, the estate,
or the other creditors. But if the debtor successfully reorganizes and
emerges from Chapter 11, then these punitive fines will be discharged
under section 1141(d) unless granted administrative expense priority.
This discharge would be a manifestly unfair result because it would
directly advantage the debtor over its competitors. Because of this
element of unfairness, it is within the spirit of Reading to grant these
punitive fines administrative expense priority.
On the other hand, if the Chapter 11 debtor in possession who
has incurred a postpetition punitive fine subsequently converts to
Chapter 7, then the fairness rationale for granting the fine adminis-
trative expense priority disappears. Denying these fines administra-
tive expense priority does not disadvantage competitors because the
debtor will not emerge from bankruptcy. Thus, because these
punitive fines never benefitted the estate, and because priority for
these fines is not required in the interest of fairness, administrative
expense priority should be denied. 116
This alternative grants or denies administrative expense
priority for postpetition punitive fines incurred during a Chapter 11
proceeding based upon the ultimate disposition of the case as either a
Chapter 11 reorganization or a Chapter 7 liquidation. At first glance,
this idea appears to conflict with the all-or-nothing nature of an ad-
ministrative expense. But if actual and necessary administrative
expenses are defined as those costs for which fairness to all interested
116. Note that compensatory fines such as in Spunt v. Charlesbank Laundry, Inc. (In re
Charlesbank Laundry, Inc.), 755 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1985), would still receive administrative
expense priority because of the Reading fairness rationale.
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parties requires priority-a definition fully supported by
Reading-then an argument for granting or denying administrative
expense priority based on the end result of the proceeding is simply
another way of distinguishing those cases where fairness dictates that
certain costs receive administrative expense priority.117
Even if this alternative is substantively superior to outright
allowance of administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive
fines, two questions remain: first, whether this alternative better
effectuates the policies underlying bankruptcy; and second, whether
the bankruptcy courts have the authority and practical ability to im-
plement a system that grants or denies administrative expense prior-
ity based on the outcome of the Chapter 11 proceeding.
B. Effectuation of Bankruptcy Policies
This proposed alternative to a bright line rule of granting ad-
ministrative expense priority for postpetition punitive fines effectu-
ates several policies that bankruptcy seeks to accommodate. This
interpretation ensures compliance with valid state laws, guarantees
no competitive advantage to the debtor from noncompliance, and
produces equitable results for prepetition creditors with compensatory
claims by insuring that noncompensatory claims intended solely to
punish the debtor do not overwhelm or reduce compensatory distribu-
tions.
117. An analogous approach may be developing in the context of the trustee's abandonment
power under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994). In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a trustee
may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably
designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. But the court then
severely limited the scope of this extraordinarily broad holding-
This exception to the abandonment power... is a narrow one. It does not encompass a
speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from aban-
donment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not rea-
sonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and identifiable
harm.
Id. at 507 n.9.
Faced with this discord between broad holding and narrow limitation, some bankruptcy
courts have limited the broad Midlantic holding where no imminent threat of harm exists and
where no unencumbered assets are available. See John W. Ames et al., Midlantic's Footnote
Followed: Abandonment Allowed Where No Imminent Harm is Perceived, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
June 1983, at 8. This "equitable" approach recognizes that what is really at stake is a balancing
of risk of harm to the public-clearly a valid concern of nonbankruptcy law-and the core
bankruptcy concern of maximizing the assets of the estate for the benefit of prepetition
creditors.
This equitable balancing of interests, as opposed to a bright-line declaration that abandon-
ment cannot occur in violation of any state law, is analogous to the balancing of interests
suggested in this Note.
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Under this interpretation, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession
wishing to emerge from bankruptcy has every incentive to comply
with state laws, because postpetition punitive fines will have to be
paid in full before the debtor can emerge. 118 Further, to the extent
that Reading is correct in assuming that prepetition creditors actively
monitor and control the actions of the debtor in possession, these
creditors have full incentive to force appointment of a trustee or
conversion to Chapter 7 if the debtor in possession fails to comply
with state laws. The creditors know that every dollar of punitive
fines assessed reduces the amount available to the prepetition
creditors in the reorganization plan."1 Thus the incentive structure of
this interpretation does not disfavor compliance with state laws.
Allowing administrative expense priority in successful reor-
ganizations also ensures that the bankruptcy debtor receives no com-
petitive advantage from being in bankruptcy.120 If the debtor emerges,
it can do so only after paying all postpetition punitive fines in full as
administrative expenses. Thus the reorganized bankruptcy debtor
must pay exactly the same fines as if it were not in bankruptcy. But
if the case is finally converted to Chapter 7, then the issue of competi-
tive neutrality between the bankruptcy debtor and its competitors
disappears. The key is recognizing that this is true for punitive fines
imposed during both the Chapter 11 and the subsequent Chapter 7
proceeding. If a $1,000,000 punitive fine is denied administrative
expense priority (and subsequently discharged under section 1141(d)
upon confirmation of the reorganization plan), then the debtor will
emerge from bankruptcy with a spare $1,000,000 not available to its
competitors who violated the same laws outside of bankruptcy. But if
the debtor never emerges from bankruptcy, no competitive advantage
arises from the denial of administrative expense priority for a
Chapter 11 postpetition punitive fine.'12
In the case of a conversion to Chapter 7, the competitive
neutrality fairness concern is replaced by the other fairness concern:
the Reading concern for reaching a "natural and just" distribution
which ensures "fairness to all persons having claims against an
insolvent."122 As the court in N.P. Mining correctly observed, Reading
did not create a per se postpetition-beats-prepetition fairness rule.
118. See supra note 99.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
120. See supra Part HI.B.3.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
122. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477, 482 (1968).
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Instead, Reading created a compensation-based fairness rule that
compensated parties injured by the estate before prepetition credi-
tors."2 Denial of administrative expense priority for postpetition
punitive fines comports with this compensatory fairness principle,
and in general supports the norm that compensation for actual harm
should take precedence over punitive fines, especially when resources
are scarce.124
Denying administrative expense priority for postpetition puni-
tive fines in cases that are converted to Chapter 7 would prioritize
these claims in a "natural and just" position. When a case is con-
verted to Chapter 7, postpetition punitive fines denied administrative
expense priority under this interpretation are converted into prepeti-
tion claims accorded the same priority as if they had actually arisen
prepetition.12 5  Section 726(a)(4) assigns fourth priority to "any fine,
penalty or forfeiture... or punitive damages ... to the extent that
such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for
actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim."126 This
fourth priority is below the second priority accorded to compensatory
claims but above the sixth priority held by the debtor. 2 7 Thus in a
Chapter 7 distribution, claims for punitive fines receive nothing until
all compensatory unsecured claims have been paid, and the debtor
123. Id.; see also Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart), 536 F.2d 950, 954
(1st Cir. 1976) ("Section 64(a)(1), in addition, has been interpreted as providing general
protection to claimants that are injured by the debtor-in-possession's operation of the business
even though their claims did not arise from transactions that were necessary to preserve or
rehabilitate the estate.").
124. This policy judgment underlies the reduced priority of prepetition punitive claims
under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1994). While postpetition matters are treated differently from
prepetition and the limitation of section 726(a) is on its face not applicable to postpetition fines,
the Supreme Court has only allowed administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive
fines in the tax context. This allowance can be justified on the historically different treatment
the Court has given to governmental taxing entities compared with other creditors, and it is
now expressly embodied in section 503(b)(1)(C): -here shall be allowed administrative ex-
penses.., including any fine, penalty, or reduction in credit relating to a tax of a kind specified
[above]." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(C) (1994).
Thus while Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966), and Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57
(1939), can be read as demonstrating a broad intent to grant administrative expense priority for
any postpetition punitive fine, these cases can also be read as tax cases that are not controlling
outside the tax context. This latter interpretation is supported by the express inclusion of tax
penalties (but no other penalties) in the text of section 503(b).
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1994). Under section 348(d), a claim arising "after the order
for relief but before conversion in a case that is converted [to Chapter 7], other than a claim
specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated for all purposes as if such claim had
arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the petition."
126. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) does not expressly include compensatory fines, but this category
of priority is a catch-all that by exclusion from section 726(a)(4) includes compensatory fines up
to the amount of actual pecuniary loss.
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(who, unless a trustee had been appointed, is the culpable lawbreaker
who caused the punitive fine to be assessed) receives nothing until all
punitive fines have been paid.
Further, the bankruptcy court's powers of equitable subordina-
tion under section 510(c) 128 allow it to deal with situations where a
particularly strong prepetition creditor had or should have had the
power and knowledge to stop the debtor in possession's violations
which caused the punitive fines to be imposed.129 If the court deter-
mines that a prepetition creditor had this power and knowledge but
let the violations continue in hopes of receiving a higher return, then
this inequitable conduct would be sufficient grounds for the court to
subordinate that individual claim.130 This use of section 510(c)
equitable subordination is much more realistic and fair than the de
facto universal subordination of prepetition creditors under cases like
United States v. Elliott.3 ' Elliott held that "once the petition is filed
the [prepetition] creditors lose their 'innocent' status."32 This rule
seems both unduly formalistic and unfair. It would be far more
realistic and fair to equitably subordinate only those claimants who
truly had the power and ability to enforce debtor compliance, but
chose not to do so.
In summary, granting administrative expense priority for
postpetition punitive fines upon successful reorganization, but deny-
ing this priority if the case is converted to Chapter 7, solves both
dilemmas presented by these fines. This alternative ensures
competitive neutrality and compliance with valid state laws, and it
provides fairness to all claimants against the estate. It is superior on
policy grounds to both outright allowance and outright denial of ad-
ministrative expense priority. The only remaining questions are
whether this solution is within judicial power and can be practically
implemented.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994) (granting courts equitable subordination powers).
129. This fiction that creditors control the debtor in great detail is likely true for at least
some creditors in some cases, but most certainly is not true of all or even most creditors.
130. See, e.g., In re Mobil Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that
equitable subordination is triggered by "some type of inequitable conduct" by a creditor to the
detriment of other creditors or unfair benefit of the party acting inequitably).
131. 761 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 171.
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C. Fidelity to Congress's Interpretive Grant
The text of the Bankruptcy Code suggests that Congress
approved of a role for the courts in interpreting and developing the
concept of actual and necessary costs entitled to administrative
expense priority. In completely overhauling federal bankruptcy law,
Congress could have overruled Reading. Instead it adopted almost
the same language in section 503(b)(1)(A) as it had used in section
64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.133 The legislative history for section
503 indicates no concern with judicial interpretations of actual and
necessary costs. Only the treatment of taxes and related interest and
penalties under section 503(b) appeared to have engendered any real
congressional scrutiny.13 4
Where Congress did diverge from the text of section 64(a)(1), it
used expansive language evidencing an intent that the courts play a
continuing role in interpreting and developing the concept of actual
and necessary costs. For instance, Congress inserted the word
"including" into its description of actual and necessary costs, 35 and
section 102(3) defines as a rule of construction that "'includes' and
'including' are not limiting."136
D. Feasibility of Judicial Implementation
The final question to be addressed is whether the suggested
interpretation of actual and necessary costs entitled to administrative
expense priority could be implemented. Congress vested exceptionally
broad discretion in the bankruptcy courts as to the mechanics of
133. See Al Copeland Enters., Inc. v. Texas (In re Copeland), 991 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir.
1993). In In re Execuair Corp., 125 B.R. 600 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), the court noted that:
After the Reading decision, the Bankruptcy Code was completely revised and Congress
made no substantial changes in the definition of administrative claim. Had they chosen
to do so, Congress could have defined administrative expense so as to overrule the
Reading case.... In fact, it appears that they broadened the concept of administrative
expense claim by using the word "including" to demonstrate that the sub-parts of §
503(b)(1) are examples and not limitations of what can be determined to be an adminis-
trative claim.
Id. at 602-03.
134. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 66 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5852; H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 355 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6311. The Senate and
House Reports have identical (and equally uninformative) language defining administrative
expenses under section 503. In fact, these Reports use identical language to describe section 503
of the Bankruptcy Code except for the tax provisions, where the two Reports diverge. See S.
REP. No. 95-989, at 66; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 355. The Reports suggest that Congress did
not closely consider section 503 except for the tax-related language.
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1994).
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administrative expense priority. The courts have almost unfettered
discretion in how and when to handle allowance and payment of a
claim for administrative expense priority.1 7 Section 503(b) only
requires that "[a]fter notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed
administrative expenses."138 The Bankruptcy Rules likewise provide
no significant limitations on the court's discretion regarding the
mechanics of administrative expenses. 3 9 The absence of any guidance
on administrative expenses leaves the bankruptcy courts with broad
discretion on mechanics.
The most direct technique for implementing the suggested
alternative involves the court's claim reconsideration power under
Bankruptcy Rule 3008. Rule 3008 provides that "[a] party in interest
may move for reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a
claim against the estate. The court after a hearing on notice shall
enter an appropriate order." 40 Although the Rule speaks only of al-
lowing or disallowing a claim, the Committee Note indicates that this
Rule would apply to a motion for reconsideration of allowance of
administrative expense priority under section 503(b): "After reconsid-
eration, the court may... accord the claim a priority different from
that originally assigned it, or enter any other appropriate order."4'
Thus upon the original motion during Chapter 11, the court
can grant administrative expense priority for postpetition punitive
fines, based on the fact that such fines are actual and necessary costs
because of the fairness concern of competitive neutrality. The court
need not allow disbursement of the fine amount until the effective
date of the plan. But if instead of a successful reorganization the
Chapter 11 proceeding is converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, then
subsequent to this conversion the court can reconsider the order
137. See COLLIER, supra note 24, § 503.02(1] ("[C]ourts exercise their discretion in setting
bar dates according to the circumstances of each case."); id. § 503.03 ("The appropriate time for
making payments from the estate for allowed administrative expenses is not directly specified
in the Bankruptcy Code or Rules."); id. § 503.03[3] ("[Tihe timing for payment of administrative
claims is a matter to be determined within the discretion of the bankruptcy court.").
138. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).
139. FED. R. BANKEI PRoc. 3009 is the only Bankruptcy Rule having any impact on the
mechanics of administrative expenses. Rule 3009 requires that "[i]n a chapter 7 case, dividends
to creditors shall be paid as promptly as practicable." This rule supports the allowance of in-
terim distributions to creditors in large chapter 7 cases. COLLIER, supra note 24, § 503.03.
Neither this Rule nor any other statutory provision or Rule, though, mandates that administra-
tive expense claims be administered or paid before final distribution in Chapter 7 or the plan's
effective date in Chapter 11.
140. FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 3008.
141. FED. R. BANKmI PROC. 3008 advisory committee note; see In re Zeig, 194 B.R. 469
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
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allowing administrative expense priority. Based upon the elimination
of the competitive neutrality fairness concern because of the
conversion to Chapter 7, and on the absence of any benefit to the
estate, the court can, upon reconsideration, deny priority for the
postpetition punitive fines. Upon this denial, these postpetition, pre-
conversion claims are treated by operation of section 348(d) as
prepetition claims entitled to fourth distribution priority under
section 726(a)(4).
While the reconsideration of administrative expense priority
based upon the outcome of the Chapter 11 proceeding may seem
problematic at first blush, it is substantively appropriate once the role
of fairness concerns in determining actual and necessary costs is
appreciated. It is procedurally appropriate because reconsideration of
a prior order is an "ancient and elementary power" of a court.42
V. CONCLUSION
Thirty years after being decided, Reading Co. v. Brown re-
mains the key to understanding the impact of fairness considerations
on administrative expense priority. Punitive fines, however, are a
marked departure from the issue presented in Reading, so the effect
of the compensatory fairness principle from Reading in the punitive
context will only become evident if the Court takes a case addressing
this issue. The Court has not done so, and in the interim, lower
courts must muddle through with reference to the principles of
Reading and Section 959.
Reading establishes that where Congress has given the courts
interpretive latitude in bankruptcy, fairness provides a significant
non-textual interpretive tool: the "decisive statutory objective [of
bankruptcy is] fairness to all persons having claims against the insol-
vent."143 Reading identifies one clear fairness principle: it is "more
natural and just" that "those injured by the operation of the business
during an arrangement should... recover ahead of those for whose
benefit the business is carried on."144 A second critical fairness princi-
ple emerges from the underlying competitive neutrality purpose of
Section 959. This section seeks to insure that bankruptcy does not
provide a competitively advantageous haven from which the debtor
142. Central Ill. Co. v. Irving Trust Co. (In re Pottasch Bros. Co.), 79 F.2d 613, 616 (2d Cir.
1935).
143. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471,477 (1968).
144. Id. at 482.
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can continue to operate while avoiding costly and onerous regulatory
requirements that must be observed by its competitors. Fairness to
competitors and an understanding of the perverse incentives that an
opposite ruling would create require that a debtor who successfully
reorganizes and emerges from Chapter 11 must pay punitive fines
fully, just as would a competitor outside of bankruptcy.
Compensatory fairness and competitive neutrality cannot be
reconciled with one another under the current judicial preference for
granting outright administrative expense priority for postpetition
punitive fines. But both of these principles can be given full effect
under a more flexible outcome-sensitive application of administrative
expense priority. In a Chapter 11 reorganization, competitive neu-
trality requires that punitive fines be granted administrative expense
priority as actual and necessary costs. If the Chapter 11
reorganization is converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, however, then
upon motion by the Chapter 7 trustee the court can reconsider the
order allowing administrative expense priority. If the court believes
that a dominant prepetition creditor had the power and knowledge to
force the debtor to comply with state laws but failed to do so, the court
can equitably subordinate this individdal creditor's claims under
section 510(c).
This suggested interpretation is within the courts' broad inter-
pretive grant from Congress, is procedurally achievable, and has a
number of beneficial results relative to the current judicial response
to this issue. This interpretation views Reading for what it is: a revo-
lutionary case that established a fairness-driven exception to the
benefit requirement for actual and necessary costs. Recognizing
Reading as a specific and limited exception to the benefit requirement
reinvigorates a common sense understanding of actual and necessary
costs. 145 This interpretation is refreshingly simple compared with the
'costs ordinarily incident' rationale employed by some courts, 146 which
has the practical effect of rendering all postpetition costs actual and
145. See McBain, supra note 11, at 243 (noting that at present the determination of actual
and necessary costs of preserving the estate "has become an elusive, fact-specific determination
that provides little guidance for potential litigants").
146. See, e.g., Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 116 F.3d 16, 20
(1st Cir. 1997).
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necessary. Most importantly, however, this reading of Reading best
effectuates the Court's decisive bankruptcy concern: fairness to all
persons having claims against the debtor.
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